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Foucault and La Boétie 
 
 
The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude….1 
--Michel Foucault 
 
la critique, cela sera l’art de l’inservitude volontaire, celui de l’indocilité réfléchie.2 
--Michel Foucualt 
 
  
 It is perhaps stating the obvious to observe that Michel Foucault left a remarkably wide-
ranging critical oeuvre. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, as he worked on what would become the 
second and third volumes of the History of Sexuality, Foucault offered several retrospective 
accounts of what he then described as a fairly unified project, one that sought to develop the 
critical tools and historical perspectives necessary to understand the emergence and workings of 
what he had come to refer to as governmentality.3 Étienne de La Boétie, on the other hand, only 
                                                          
1 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Power, ed. James D. Faubian, vol. 3, Essential 
Works of Foucault (New York: The New Press, 2000), 342. 
2 Michel Foucault, “Qu’est-Ce Que La Critique? [Critique et Aufklärung],” Bulletin de La 
Sociéte Française de Philosophie 84, no. 2 (1990): 39. 
3 In one of the most succinct of these, presented during a seminar in 1982 just two years before 
his death, Foucault explained that “I have attempted a history of the organization of knowledge 
with respect to both domination and the self. For example, I studied madness not in terms of the 
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left one influential and widely known text, his Discours de la servitude volontaire. As I have 
demonstrated elsewhere,4 however, voluntary servitude proves to be a concern in almost all of La 
Boétie’s works from his Mémoire sur la pacification des troubles where he describes—if indeed 
he is the author—how the people “aprend à desobeyr voluntiers”5 and his Vingt et neuf sonnets to 
his translations of Plutarch and Xenophon. 
It would be impossible in the pages that follow to do justice to the many potential 
constellations one might construct between the work of these two thinkers. I will instead focus 
on a few nodes, beginning with what is as far as I know Foucault’s only explicit reference to La 
Boétie and concluding with a brief meditation on a possible allusion to the Discours de la 
Servitude volontaire in Foucault’s talk “Qu’est-ce que la critique? [critique et Aufklärung].” 
Between these two sections I compare how power, freedom, and resistance are understood in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
criteria of formal sciences but to show what type of management of individuals inside and 
outside of asylums was made possible by this strange discourse. This encounter between the 
technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call ‘governmentality’.” See Michel 
Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, vol. 1, The Essential 
Works of Foucault (New York: The New Press, 1997), 225. Other retrospective formulations by 
Foucault of his life’s work include “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of 
Freedom,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, vol. 1 (New York: The New Press, 1997), 281–82 
and L’usage des plaisirs, Histoire de La Sexualité (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), 10–11.  
4 Marc Schachter, Voluntary Servitude and the Erotics of Friendship: From Classical Antiquity 
to Early Modern France (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). 
5 Étienne de La Boétie, Mémoire sur la pacification des troubles, ed. Malcolm Smith (Genève: 
Droz, 1983), 101–2. 
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Servitude volontaire and in several of Foucault’s texts, address the potential reasons for the 
absence of this treatise from Foucault’s meditations on governmentality, and ask whether La 
Boétie’s  translation of Xenophon’s On Household Management might not offer a different—and 
potentially more constructive—point of departure for thinking La Boétie and Foucault together.  
My comparison of the political thought of Foucault and several of the key ideas in La 
Boétie’s Servitude volontaire will in part highlight some of the limits of the treatise’s critique. 
This may seem unreasonable but I do think that it is important particularly because certain 
modern authors seem to have been “enchantés et charmés par le nom seul” of La Boétie.6  
However much La Boétie’s indictment of voluntary servitude might resonate with some of our 
own preoccupations—including the manufacture of consent and the constant emergence of new 
forms of panem et circenses in contemporary society—there are serious limitations that constrain 
the radical nature of a political critique one might find in the Servitude volontaire and it is worth 
considering them. For example, elsewhere I have discussed how “the Servitude volontaire’s 
investment in friendship, fraternity and nature at once guarantees its efficacy and its enduring 
popularity while limiting the range of its critique” because of what these categories enable and 
exclude.7 Intriguingly, however, as I will suggest below, La Boétie’s Xenophon translation may 
offer an implicit rejoinder to some of the limits of the analysis offered in the better known 
treatise.  
So far as I have been able to determine, Foucault only names La Boétie twice, both times 
in the same context, while responding to a 1970 article by Jean-Marc Pelorson that critiqued his 
                                                          
6 Estienne de La Boétie, De la servitude volontaire, ou, Contr’un, ed. Malcolm Smith (Genève: 
Droz, 1987), 34. 
7 Schachter, Voluntary Servitude and the Erotics of Friendship, 69. 
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interpretation of Cervantes’ Don quixote.8 Foucault’s rejoinder was in large part to demonstrate 
that many of the claims in the article were factually inaccurate: he was accused of saying things 
he didn’t say and of not saying things that he did say. His invocation of La Boétie appeared in 
the context of a discussion of a different order in which he makes an argument based in part on 
the evolving meaning of words as witnessed in a range of early modern texts, among them the 
Servitude volontaire: “the word niais designates something completely different from our present 
word sot in that phrase where La Boétie says of Claudius that he was not simply simple but 
niais” (86-87). Foucault’s point seems to be twofold: that the meaning or usage of some of the 
words that he lists—niais for example—have changed over the years and that the lexical 
opposition between insanity and foolishness we now make was not always self-evident.  
The passage from the Servitude volontaire referred to by Foucault occurs near the end of 
the treatise in a section where La Boétie addressed the capricious cruelty of the tyrants of old. 
After listing several examples, including that of Claudius’ own mother, La Boétie writes: 
 
Who was ever more easily manipulated [aisé à manier], more simple [simple], or to put it 
better more truly a dimwit [niais] that the Emperor Claudius ? Who was ever more 
infatuated by a woman than he by Messalina? In the end, he put her in into the 
executioner’s hands. The simplemindedness [simplesse] —if that’s what they have—to 
not know how to do good resides in tyrants. But somehow, ultimately, what little intellect 
[esprit] they have awakens to expedite their cruelty towards even those close to them.9  
 
                                                          
8 Jean-Marc Pelorson, “Michel Foucault et l’Espagne,” La Pensée 152, no. August (1970): 88–
99. 
9 La Boétie, Servitude volontaire, 72. My translation. 
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I would submit that niais here is not tinged with some sense of madness; instead, it is effectively 
synonymous with sot. At least on this point in his response to Pelorson, Foucault was wrong. In 
support of this contention, I offer two pieces of evidence internal to La Boétie’s text. First, the 
sentence within which the word niais appears is exemplary of a ternary rhetorical figure 
repeatedly used by La Boétie in which three effectively synonymous expressions appear one 
after the other less with a change in meaning than an increase in intensity. Second, the opposition 
between “simplesse” and “esprit” in the last two sentences of the passage suggests that what La 
Boétie was referring to by niais was indeed a form of simplesse and one moreover where 
simplesse did not denote some kind of madness.10 The point is precisely not that Claude was 
“insane” or “mad” but that he was simple-minded, naïve, and seemingly tractable—before 
putting his wife to death, despite loving her, just as other capricious tyrants murdered so many of 
their family members, friends, and favorites. Unlike his friend Montaigne, who for example in 
the chapter “On the Lame” of his Essais wrote that he would rather give hellebore—a treatment 
for mental illness—than the poison hemlock to several women who confessed to having magical 
powers and were accused of being witches, La Boétie does not have much to say about 
insanity.11  
                                                          
10 An adverbial form of niais appears at another point in the Servitude volontaire and offers 
further evidence that the expression did not for La Boétie have intimations of madness: “Ainsi 
les peuples assotis, trouvans beaus ces passetemps, amusés d’un vain plaisir qui leur passoit 
devant les yeux, s’accoutumoient à servir aussi niaisement, mais plus mal, que les petits enfans 
qui pour voir les luisans images des livres enluminé, aprenent à lire” (Servitude volontaire, 58). 
11 Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. Jean Céard (Paris: Livre de Poche, 2001), 1604. A more 
fruitful avenue of inquiry might have addressed the word beste (or bête) and its semantic field, 
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Given that Foucault had read the Servitude volontaire carefully enough to recall a not 
particularly central passage in a not obviously relevant context, we might wonder why he did not 
engage more substantially with La Boétie elsewhere. I say this for several reasons. First, there 
seems to be a certain similarity between the concerns of the Servitude volontaire and Foucault’s 
own project. After all, La Boétie describes—or rather laments—a situation in which men 
voluntarily obey without external coercion: “Is is … the peoples who let themselves, or rather 
make themselves, be abused, because by ceasing to serve they would be freed from servitude.”12 
In works like Surveiller et punir, Foucault was concerned with the production of docile bodies 
whose disciplined obedience would not require force.13 The answer La Boétie proposed to 
voluntary servitude was the emancipation of the besotted mind that would then withdraw 
consent: “And you can be freed from so many indignities that beasts themselves would either not 
feel Et de tant d’indignités que les bestes mesmes ou ne les sentiroient point, ou ne 
l’endureroient point, vous pouvés vous en delivrer si vous l’essaiés, non pas de vous en delivrer, 
mais seulement de le vouloir faire. Soiés resolus de ne servir plus, et vous voila libres” (40). In a 
passage from Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault provocatively suggested that there “is no 
first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to 
oneself.”14 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
although here too I am not sure the Servitude volontaire offers good evidence for Foucault’s 
argument about the labile lexicon of madness. I hope to address the figure of the beast in the 
Servitude volontaire in a future essay. 
12 La Boétie, Servitude volontaire, 38. 
13 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1979). 
14 Michel Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham 
Burchell, Lectures at the College de France (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 252. In a 
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And yet their projects are actually quite different, these apparent similarities 
notwithstanding. As the epigraph for this essay suggests, voluntary servitude—whether to an 
oppressive government, an institution, or an individual—was not in and of itself one of 
Foucault’s key preoccupations. Instead, Foucault sought to trace transformations in the 
interlinked modalities of power and knowledge often with an eye to understanding how they 
shaped and governed subjects whether through technologies of domination or of the self. By 
comparison, while the verve with which La Boétie indicts men’s willing collaboration in their 
own disenfranchisement may be without precedent, his analysis of the ruses of power is 
essentially entirely constructed of precursors and arguably contains nothing new. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
very late interview, Foucault was asked about this claim: “In your lectures on the hermeneutics 
of the subject there is a passage in which you say that the first and only useful point of resistance 
to political power is the relationship of the self to the self.” Foucault’s response is perhaps 
relevant in the present context: “I do not believe that the only possible point of resistance to 
political power—understood, of course, as a state of domination—lies in the relationship of the 
self to the self. I am saying that ‘governmentality’ implies the relationship of the self to itself, 
and I intend this concept of ‘governmentality’ to cover the whole range of practices that 
constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom 
can use in dealing with each other. …[I]f you try to analyze power not on the basis of freedom, 
strategies, and governmentality, but on the basis of the political institution, you can only 
conceive of the subject as a subject of law…. On the other hand, I believe that the concept of 
governmentality makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject and its relationship to 
others….” See Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 299–
300. 
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what interested Foucault about emerging modalities of power was not first and foremost their 
potential role in the state’s maintenance of its authority, as Roland Bleiker reminds us in a 
discussion of superficial similarities between Foucault’s thought and that of La Boétie.15 This is 
not to say that Foucault ignored the importance of the state. Rather, Foucault contended that the 
focus on the state as the great enemy entailed a lack of attention to other axes of power—many 
of which, he emphasized, could be tactically deployed by the state—and it was these, including 
the development of new forms of rationality, that most interested him. He also observed that “[I]f 
you try to analyze power not on the basis of freedom, strategies, and governmentality, but on the 
basis of the political institution, you can only conceive of the subject as a subject of law…. On 
the other hand, I believe that the concept of governmentality makes it possible to bring out the 
freedom of the subject and its relationship to others….”16 As for La Boétie, while he famously 
refuses to sanction any form of government—despite his dubious endorsement of the French 
monarchy—the focus of his critique is political consent quite narrowly construed. He wrote, for 
example, that “si nous vivions avec les droits que la nature nous a donné et avec les 
enseignemens qu'elle nous apprend, nous serions naturellement obeissans aus parens, subjets à la 
raison et serfs de personne” (41). We might take one’s relationship to one’s parents and to reason 
as shorthand for two vast fields of inquiry that very much interested Foucault and very much not 
because he thought to do so was to abandon political inquiry but rather to expand it in necessary 
                                                          
15 Roland Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 128–30. 
16 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 300. For some 
succinct reflections on the importance of the state for thinking about power relations, see 
Foucault, “The Subject and Power.” 
9 
 
ways.17 Finally, Foucault did not think of power as something from which one could escape, 
whether by active revolt or through the withdrawal of consent. He was profoundly skeptical of 
liberation and of the achievement of freedom, as he made clear in a late interview: 
 
I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because if it is not 
treated with precautions and within certain limits, one runs the risk of falling back on the 
idea that there exists a human nature or base that… has been concealed, alienated, or 
imprisoned in and by the mechanisms of repression. According to this hypothesis, all that 
is required is to break these repressive deadlocks and man will be reconciled with 
himself, rediscover his nature or regain contact with his origin, and reestablish a full and 
positive relationship with himself.18 
 
In other words, unlike the La Boétie of the Servitude volontaire who could write “[s]oiés resolus 
de ne servir plus, et vous voila libres” (40), Foucault did not think that man could return to a 
                                                          
17 Not everyone sees the narrowly political focus of La Boétie’s critique of voluntary servitude in 
his treatise as a limitation. Miguel Abensour for example writes that “Il convient d’être autant 
plus sensible à la revolution laboétienne que la tentation est toujours présente parmi nous de 
banaliser l’idée de servitude volontaire en la voyant partout, dans les rapports intersubjectifs, 
dans l’amour, dans l’éducation, dans le travail, etc., et ce faisant de ne pas la percevoir là où La 
Boétie l’a si génialement située, dans la sphère politique.” See Miguel Abensour, “Du Bon 
Usage de L’hypothèse de La Servitude Volontaire?,” Réfractions 17, no. Winter (2006): 71–72. 
18 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 282. 
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prelapsarian freedom by throwing off his chains and returning to his natural state. Indeed, for 
Foucault, man has no natural state. 
 So what does Foucault call for instead? And can we find any more productive resonances 
between his thought and that found in La Boétie’s Servitude volontaire? Although Foucault was 
often hesitant to speak of resistance in concrete terms—indeed, he sometimes equivocated 
eloquently on the limits of the language one might use to express resistance—19, on occasion he 
does. I will offer two such examples, one drawn from the first volume of the History of Sexuality 
and the other from the preface that Foucault penned for the English edition of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. In the first volume of his History of Sexuality, Foucault asked how it 
came to pass that people thought of their sexual liberation as the achievement of freedom. Near 
the end of the volume, he wrote: 
 
We must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, one 
tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality. It is the agency of 
sex that we must break away from, if we aim—through a tactical reversal of the various 
mechanisms of sexuality—to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, 
pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance.20 
 
                                                          
19 See for example the March 1 seminar of his Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
Collège de France, 1977-78, ed. Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana 
(Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
20 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume 1, trans. Robert J. Hurley (New York: 
Vintage, 1990), 157. 
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In other words, fighting against sexual repression by claiming agency over one’s sexuality and 
its expression was a way of operating within a set of power relations that had predetermined the 
terrain of resistance and thus not a strategy for escaping them. This did not mean that Foucault 
thought that resistance was futile, as this passage makes clear, but it required a strategy that 
operated in some kind of critical relationship to sexuality—bodies and pleasures rather than 
sex/desire. As has been often noted of the Servitude volontaire, it does not call for a revolution or 
propose a preferable model for the polity. Here, we might see an inkling of a parallel with the 
point that Foucault makes in his critique of sexual liberation. The establishment of a new 
political order would not escape the logic of government that of necessity would seem to raise 
the problem of voluntary servitude. La Boétie’s solution appears to be to suspend his argument at 
the crux of the critique rather than attempting to sketch out a contrary logic as Foucault 
sometimes did.21 
Foucault’s preface to Anti-Oedipus offers perhaps the closest articulation in Foucault’s 
work of a “voluntary servitude” that should be resisted. Foucault wrote that the book’s “major 
enemy… is fascism… and not only historical fascism…but also the fascism in us all, in our 
heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very 
                                                          
21 A forceful case for the open-ended nature of La Boétie’s critique such that any attempt to use 
it in the service of a political project would domesticate the text’s radical nature has been 
developed in aMiguel Abensour and Michel Gauchet, “Présentation: Les Leçons de La Servitude 
et Leur Destin,” in De La Servitude Volontaire (Paris: Payot, 1976), vii–xxix. See also Jean 
Lafond, “Le Discours de La Servitude Volontaire de La Boétie et La Rhétorique de La 
Déclamation,” in Mélanges Sur La Littérature de La Renaissance : À La Mémoire de V.-L. 
Saulnier, Travaux D’humanisme et Renaissance (Geneva: Droz, 1984), 735–45. 
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thing that dominates and exploits us” (xiii). 22 But even here, what he means is something very 
different from what we find in the Servitude volontaire, for example when La Boétie writes that 
it is the people “qui, aiant le chois ou d’estre serf ou d’estre libre, quitte sa franchise et prend le 
joug, qui consent à son mal ou plustot le pourchasse” (38). Once more, La Boétie is concerned 
with political submission, what Miguel Abensour, drawing on Pierre Clastres, refers to as the 
State. Crucially, the distinction between “historical fascism” and the “fascism … in our everyday 
behavior” made by Foucault here points in a different direction. Describing Anti-Oedipus as a 
handbook of anti-fascist practice, Foucault provided a list of principles to be followed if one 
aspires to live an anti-fascist life. Among these is the following: “Do not demand of politics that 
it restore the ‘rights’ of the individual, as philosophy has defined them. The individual is the 
product of power. What is needed is to ‘de-individualize’ by means of multiplication and 
displacement, diverse combinations” (xiv). Elsewhere, in a related formulation that particularly 
foregrounded the role of the state, Foucault wrote that “the political, ethical, philosophical 
problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state’s 
institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization linked to 
the state.”23 In both these texts, Foucault suggested the need to turn away from an understanding 
of politics in terms of domination and resistance within which we think of our subjectivity or 
individuality as the locus from which we might resist because subjectivity and individuality are 
                                                          
22 Michel Foucault, “Preface,” in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), xi–xiv. 
23 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 336. 
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themselves products of the system we should be trying to evade.24 Might we locate the addressee 
hailed by the Servitude volontaire within a genealogy of the political subject critiqued by 
Foucault? Would it matter that La Boétie doesn’t look to the State as the entity that should 
guarantee the rights of man but rather to Nature?  
At this point, I would like to turn to a different question: why didn’t Foucault discuss the 
Servitude volontaire in his work on governmentality in the sixteenth century? In the famous 
governmentality lecture of Securité, territoire, population, Foucault argued both that there was 
increased attention to governance in the sixteenth century and that new forms of governance 
began to emerge in the period. The increased attention to governance occurred across a range of 
axes including self-control, the education of children, pastoral care, and, he insisted perhaps least 
of all, “the government of the state by the prince” (88).25 Foucault saw this preoccupation with 
governance as happening at the intersection of two movements: “the process that, dismantling 
feudal structures, organizes and sets up the great territorial, administrative, and colonial states” 
and “a completely different movement, but with complex interactions with the first… that, with 
the Reformation and then the Counter Reformation, questions how one wishes to be spiritually 
directed here on earth for one’s salvation” (88-89). The resulting literature “breaks out, explodes 
                                                          
24 The production of the individual subject was something that Foucault returned to in various 
ways over the years. For particularly cogent and pertinent discussions, see the section “Docile 
Bodies” in Discipline and Punish as well as Foucault’s “‘Omnes et Singulatim’: Toward a 
Critique of Political Reason,” in Power, vol. 3, 3 vols., The Essential Works of Foucault (New 
York: The New Press, 2000), 298–325. 
25 Michel Foucault, Security, territory, population. 
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in the middle of the sixteenth century” and then continues through to the end of the eighteenth 
century while undergoing a series of transformations that Foucault proposed to track (89).  
With its indictment of the mystery of political consent, linked by many scholars to the 
centralization of the monarchic state underway in the middle of sixteenth century, La Boétie’s 
Discours de la Servitude volontaire would seem to be a part of this proliferating literature, as 
would his Mémoire sur la pacification des troubles, which offered political and religious 
solutions to the presence of two Christian denominations within France. Yet Foucault mentions 
neither in this context despite the fact that his response to Pelorson’s critique discussed above 
suggests a more than passing familiarity with the Servitude volontaire. Why not? And what 
might Foucault’s considerations of the texts that he does address tell us about La Boétie’s 
Servitude volontaire in particular? 
In the pivotal lecture of Securité, territoire, population, Foucault proposed to study the 
early development of the emerging literature of governmentality by comparing it with 
Machiavelli’s Prince, which he contended served as a foil for a series of subsequent political 
treatises. Foucault noted that this literature represented the doctrine found in the Prince in a 
uniform fashion: 
For Machiavelli, the Prince exists in a relationship of singularity and externality, of 
transcendence, to his principality. Machiavelli’s Prince receives his principality either 
through inheritance, or acquisition, or by conquest; in any case, he is not a part of it, but 
external to it. (91)26 
                                                          
26 La Boétie also identifies three ways that tyrants come to power, although not precisely the 
same : “les uns ont le Roiaume par election du peuple, les autres par la force des armes, les 
autres par succession de leur race” (44).  
15 
 
Most important for Foucault is that “there is no fundamental, essential, natural, and juridical 
connection between the Prince and his principality: externality, the Prince’s transcendence, is the 
principle” (91). What this means for Machiavelli is that the Prince is threatened from the outside 
by enemies and internally by a subjected population with no intrinsic reason to accept his rule. 
According to Foucault, the goal of sovereignty in the Prince—as construed by the anti-
Machiavelli literature he was exploring—is therefore is to protect the sovereign and his control 
over the kingdom rather than the kingdom itself: “The object of the art of governing, the art of 
being Prince that Machiavelli puts forward, must be this fragile link between the prince and his 
principality” (92). Thus the art of governing involves the identification of dangers and the 
manipulation of force to enable to prince to maintain his link with the controlled territory. This 
art of governing is replaced in the anti-Machiavelli tracts by an insistence on the art of 
government. In a move that is familiar to us from the first volume of the history of sexuality, 
rather than considering this literature merely as an attempt to resist the “powerful and subversive 
thought” found in the Prince, he wanted to look at it “as a positive genre, with its specific object, 
concepts, and strategy.” (91) In other words, Foucault did want to think of power as theorized in 
terms of an art of government only as repressive or responsive but also as productive. 
The work that Foucault considered in order to begin elaborating the art of governing was 
Le miroir politique by Guillaume de La Perrière. First published in 1555 in Lyon, it is roughly 
contemporary with the Servitude volontaire. Reprinted in Paris in 1567, it would eventually be 
translated and printed in English in the last years of the century. (I have consulted the 1567 
edition.) The volume addressed a series of topics, each with its own heading and discussion, that 
were organized through tree-like diagrams. Foucault’s engagement with the book is actually 
16 
 
quite limited. His remarks all focus on one section entitled “gouvernée” found on folios 23v and 
24r, the crucial part of which I have reproduced here:  
 
GOUVERNEE. 
Gouvernement presuppose ordre, d’autant que sans ordre on ne peult deuement 
gouverner. Gouvernement est, droicte disposition des choses, desquelles on prent charge 
pour les conduire jusques à fin convenable : comme descrivent les Philosophes moraux et 
Theologiens, les noms desquels (à cause de brefueté) je tais. Gouverneur peult estre 
appellé tout Monarche, Empereur, Roy, Prince, Seigneur, Magistrat, Prelat, Juge, & 
semblable. Tout gouverneur de Royaume ou Republique doit avoir en soy, 
necessairement sagesse, patience, et diligence. Comme le naucher ou pilote peult (par sa 
folie) estre cause du naufrage de son navire : semblablement tout gouverneur de 
Republique ou cité, peult estre cause de la perdition des citoyens, par son indiscretion…. 
Que doit avoir un bon gouverneur de Republique ? Il doit avoir extreme diligence au 
gouvernement de la cité, & si le bon père de famille (pour estre bon econome, c’est à-dire 
mesnager) doit estre en sa privee maison le premier levé, & le dernier couché, que doit 
faire le gouverneur de la cité, en laquelle il y a plusieurs maisons ? & le Roy, au 
Royaume duquel il y a plusieurs citez ? (23r-24v)27 
 
Foucault suggested that in the medieval period through to the early Renaissance, sovereignty was 
exercised primarily in order to maintain control over territory. The first innovation that he 
                                                          
27 Guillaume de La Perrière, Le miroir politique, contenant diuerses manieres de gouuerner & 
policer les Republiques (Paris: Pour Vincent Norment, & Ieanne Bruneau, 1567). 
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highlighted in La Perrière’s text was that in it the earlier model of sovereignty was no longer 
paramount; one now governed things (“des choses”). Foucault clarified that “I do not think that it 
is a matter of an opposition between things and men, but rather of showing that government is 
not related to the territory, but to a sort of complex of men and things” (98). Furthermore, he 
observed that these “things” must be led to their appropriate ends, which he distinguished from 
the general notion of the common good. He remarked that jurists and theologians say “that the 
common good exists when all subjects obey the law without fail, perform their appointed task 
well, practice the trades to which they are assigned, and respect the established order, insofar as 
this order conforms to the laws imposed by God on nature and men” (98). But with La Perrière, 
we see “the emergence of a new type of finality” (99)—things are governed not for the common 
good but for a suitable end, which can differ in order to achieve a range of goals. Foucault 
continues, “And one will arrange (disposer) things to achieve these different ends. This word 
‘disposer’ is important because, what enabled sovereignty to achieve its aim of obedience to the 
laws, was the law itself; law and sovereignty were absolutely united. Here, on the contrary, it is 
not a matter of imposing a law on men, but of the disposition of things, that is to say, of 
employing tactics rather than laws, or, of as far as possibile employing laws as tactics; arranging 
things so that this or that end may be achieved through a certain number of means” (99). This 
distinction between tactics and law is crucial to understanding the power that Foucault is 
interested in analyzing. 
Foucault also pointed out that La Perrière used the analogy of a family with a father to 
describe the sort of wise, benevolent rule that he was calling for. This led to an analogy between 
the political state and the household which altered the understanding of what it meant to govern. 
The model did not only imply that the head of the state should be benevolent to those dependent 
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on him, as in a family, but also that he should manage the state in ways analogous to the 
management of a household. While Foucault thought that the evolving analogy between the state 
and the family was part of the transformation in understandings of governance that he was 
tracking in the sixteenth century, he also noted that eventually it would have to be surpassed for 
the emergence of modern forms of governance: “The word ‘economy’ designated a form of 
government in the sixteenth century; in the eighteenth century, through a series of complex 
processes that are absolutely crucial for our history, it will designate a level of reality and a field 
of intervention for government” (94). Important for this development would be the rise of a 
concept of population as something to be managed which would lead to another crucial shift in 
the model that Foucault saw beginning to emerge in the sixteenth century: “The family will 
change from being a model to being an instrument; it will become a privileged instrument for the 
government of the population rather than a chimerical model for good government” (105). 
 Why wasn’t the Servitude volontaire part of this story? Perhaps because it did not partake 
of the developments Foucault was interested in tracing. This is for several reasons. Even if La 
Boétie’s motivation for writing the Servitude volontaire was the ongoing centralization of the 
monarchic state, his preoccupation with people’s collusion in their own exploitation meant that 
his treatise was not focused on the art of governing. He did list a range of strategies employed by 
tyrants to maintain their power but they are primarily variations on the panem et circenses theme 
or else linked to the diffusion of propaganda designed to increase the awe in which the tyrant is 
held by the populace. His examples were also all drawn from classical antiquity, even if they had 
contemporary analogues. Neither of these involved a shift away from the art of governing to the 
art of governance. If there is a trace of the art of government in La Boétie’s treatise, it would be 
19 
 
in La Boétie insistence on several occasions that the consequences of voluntary servitude are the 
devastation of one’s own estate. For example, he writes: 
 
vous semés vos fruicts afin qu’il en face le degast. Vous meublés et remplissés vos 
maisons, afin de fournir à ses pilleries. Vous nourrissés vos filles afin qu’il ait dequoy 
saouler sa luxure. Vous nourrissez vos enfans afin que pour le mieulx qu’il leur sçauroit 
faire, il les mene en ses guerres, qu’il les conduise à la boucherie, qu’il les face les 
ministres de ses convoitises et les executeurs de ses vengeances. Vous rompés à la peine 
vos personnes afin qu’il se puisse mignarder en ses delices et se veautrer dans les sales et 
vilains plaisirs. Vous vous affoiblissés afin de le rendre plus fort et roide à vous tenir plus 
courte la bride. (39) 
 
The point that La Boétie is making here is that the « vous » in question willingly participates in 
the depredations described, despite their resulting in the devastation of ancestral home, family, 
and self. While this passage could be linked to the emerging managerial thought that interested 
Foucault, the obsessive concern with the figure of the tyrant that appears in this and other 
sections of the treatise established the enemy as something far closer to the prince described by 
Machiavelli (as understood by the literature on government that interests Foucault) than to the 
emerging bureaucratic or managerial state. The image is concretized in a passage shortly after 
this one:  
Je ne veux pas que vous le poussiés ou l’esbransliés, mais seulement ne le soustenés plus, 
et vous le verrés, comme un grand colosse à qui on a desrobé la base, de son pois mesme 
fondre en bas et se rompre. (40) 
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While this image might anticipate Hobbes’ Leviathan, the statue being overturned is not a 
representation of a collective or even of a government but rather of the “one” who mysteriously 
holds the populace in thrall through its active collaboration in his rule. For all the innovation of 
the Servitude volontaire—an issue to which I will briefly return below—the tyrant represented in 
its pages does not reflect the emerging model of governance that Foucault sought to identify. 
Intriguingly, however, Xenophon’s On Household Management was involved in this 
emerging model of governance. La Perrière was certainly thinking of the dialogue when he 
addressed what the pater familias would have to do “pour estre bon econome, c’est à-dire 
mesnager,” suggesting the relevance of the text for the sixteenth-century developments in 
governmental rationality that Foucault was interested in considering. Indeed, while Foucault 
suggested in the governmentality lecture that the homology between a family and a polity 
reflected an emerging understanding of managerial power in the sixteenth century, he would later 
explore the conceit’s roots, taking up Xenophon’s On Household Management for consideration 
in the second volume of his History of Sexuality. Moreover, La Boétie’s own translation shows 
that he was in a sense using the dialogue as a point of departure for his own meditations on the 
problem of consent. 
 Near the conclusion to On Household Management, Socrates’ careful questioning leads 
his interlocutor Ischomaches to acknowledge that the key to good household management is the 
ability to command well, and that whereas the technologies of farming and ordering the house 
are easily learned, the art of ruling is not. After explicitly relating the art of commanding an army 
to the art of managing a household, Ischomaches concludes the dialogue as follows: 
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Mais asseure toy que ce que ie viens de dire ne s’apprent point ny pour l’auoir veu 
faire, ny pour l’auoir ouy dire vne fois; mais ie te dis que qui le veut sçavoir faire, 
il a besoin de s’y nourrir & addresser, & encore que de sa nature il soit bien nay, 
&, ce qui est le plus fort encore, qu’il aye ie ne sçais quoy de diuin: car ie ne peus 
bonnement croire que ce bien si grand puisse entierement estre propre de 
l’homme, mais vrayement de dieu, de commander aux personnes de telle sorte 
qu’il se cognoisse clairement que c’est de leur gré. […] mais de regner sur les 
hommes malgré eux, cela donne il, à mon aduis, à ceux qu’il estime dignes de 
viure comme tantale, lequel on dit estre là bas, en enfer, languissant à tout iamais, 
& mourant de peur de mourir deux fois.28 
 
The French here underscores a fundamental distinction already made in the Greek between 
“voluntary” and “involuntary” servitude. La Boetie’s phrase “car ie ne peus bonnement croire 
que ce bien si grand puisse entierement estre propre de l’homme, mais vrayement de dieu, de 
commander aux personnes de telle sorte qu’il se cognoisse clairement que c’est de leur gré” 
translates the Greek, “οὐ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὅλον τουτὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι ἀλλὰ θεῖον, 
                                                          
28 Estienne de La Boétie, Oeuvres complètes d’Estienne de la Boëtie, ed. Paul Bonnefon 
(Bordeaux: Councouilhou, 1892), 157. It is worth noting that the conclusion to the Servitude 
volontaire makes reference to the end of Xenophon’s dialogue. See the note to the end of the 
Servitude volontaire in Smith’s edition (77n80). On La Boétie’s Xenophon translation, see also 
John O’Brien, “De l’Œconomicus a la Mesnagerie: La Boétie et Xénophon,” in Étienne de La 
Boétie: Sage Révolutionnaire et Poète Périgourdin, ed. Marcel Tetel (Paris: Champion, 2004), 
45–62. 
22 
 
τὸ ἐθελόντων ἄρχειν” which, rendered literally into English, reads as follows: “for it does not 
entirely seem to me that this good is entirely human, but rather godly, the command over the 
willing.”29 The section of the sentence following “dieu,” eighteen words in the french, translates 
the final three quoted Greek words, which can be rendered in English as “the command over the 
willing.” By expanding the account of a good ruler’s capacity for generating voluntary servitude, 
La Boétie underscores the fact that Ischomaches’s comparison is between, on the one hand, a 
conscious voluntary servitude and, on the other, involuntary servitude or tyranny. This reminds 
us of the degree to which Xenophon’s text is not only about commanding but also and more 
particularly about how to produce consent, how to rule so that those ruled “know clearly that it is 
by their agreement,” be it in the oikos or the polis.  
It is of course precisely this distinction that La Boétie finds pernicious in the Servitude 
volontaire, at least in the political sphere. Xenophon’s interest in exploring the production of 
consent also addresses many questions eschewed by La Boétie in the Servitude volontaire. 
Unlike La Boétie’s treatise, in which what it might mean to be free is not at issue, where liberty 
is understood almost exclusively in relationship to political authority, and where freedom is 
described as something that might be acquired merely by being able to say “no” to the demand of 
submission, Xenophon’s dialogue considers what it means to be free, and addressing servitude in 
multiple analogous contexts (in relationship to unbridled passions as well as marriage, slavery,  
estate management, pedagogy, and only at the end the polis) where freedom results only from an 
ongoing struggle for self-mastery. Xenophon’s dialogue also relates self-governance to the 
capacity for acquiring the consent of others, a dimension as we have just seen that is curiously 
                                                          
29 Xenophon, “Οἰκονομικός,” in Xenophontis Opera Omnia, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1921), sec. 21.12. 
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underscored in La Boétie’s translation in but one of several intriguing divergences from the 
Greek.30 
 Might considering voluntary servitude more comprehensively in La Boétie’s oeuvre—
including apparent contradictions as well as a much wider ambit of reflection spanning the care 
of the self and intersubjective relationships in addition to political rule—be a promising direction 
for future inquiry? To do so would be to displace or at least to understand differently many of the 
elements that have made the Servitude volontaire such a politically productive and provocative 
text—but it might also allow us to think more carefully about the limitations of the critique found 
in the treatise in ways that parallel Foucault’s late turn to the care of the self as a continuation—
rather than an abandonment—of his earlier, more obviously political work.  
  
Conclusion 
 
Without denying the power of the clarion call that is La Boétie’s indictment of voluntary 
servitude, I have suggested above through a comparison to Foucault’s thought that the political 
project described in the Servitude volontaire—insofar as there is one—is rather limited. Some 
have argued that it is precisely La Boétie’s apparent refusal to countenance any form of 
government, even consensual, that makes the text profoundly radical, and such a seemingly 
                                                          
30 For a more sustained discussion of La Boétie’s translations see Chapter Two of my Voluntary 
Servitude and the Erotics of Friendship. Elements of my discussion of the Xenophon translation 
are drawn from this earlier work. 
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open-ended critique certainly has its appeal.31 At the same time, I fear that even this critique is 
quite narrow insofar as it remains primarily concerned with state power.32 But there is another 
equally audacious dimension to La Boétie’s treatise which I have not been able to address above, 
one however that operates less at the level of its political program and more at the level of its 
voluntary inservitude to the intellectual traditions engaged with in the text. I mentioned earlier 
that La Boétie’s Servitude volontaire was filled with examples from antiquity that seemed 
unlikely places to find novel analyses of political power. But the way La Boétie uses some of his 
classical sources is a different matter. By opening his critique of political consent with a quote 
from Homer that was repeatedly evoked to support the monarchy—and using that quotation to 
suggest that supporting the monarchy was a matter of expediency rather than conviction—La 
                                                          
31 See for example Pierre Clastres, “Liberté, Malencontre, Innommable,” in De La Servitude 
Volontaire (Paris: Payot, 1976), 229–46. 
32 Pressed on his skepticism about liberation during an interview entitled “The Ethics of the 
Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” Foucault responded: “I am not trying to say that 
liberation as such, or this or that form of liberation, does not exist: when a colonized people 
attempts to liberate itself from colonizers, this is indeed a practice of liberation in the strict sense. 
But we know very well, and moreover in this specific case, that this practice of liberation is not 
in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom that will still be needed if this people, this 
society, and these individuals are to be able to define admissible and acceptable forms of 
existence or political society. This is why I emphasize practices of freedom over processes of 
liberation; again, the latter indeed have their place, but they do not seem to me to be capable by 
themselves of defining all the practical forms of freedom” (282-3). 
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Boétie turns a commonplace on its head while also suggesting to us the care with which we 
should read the ensuing pages.33 In more subtle ways, La Boétie’s version of On Household 
Management repeatedly bucks tradition to draw the dialogue within the ambit of his own critical 
interests. We might link these dynamics to Foucault’s observation in a 1978 talk entitled 
“Qu’est-ce que la critique? [critique et Aufklärung]” that “la critique, c’est le mouvement par 
lequel le sujet se donne le droit d’interroger la vérité sur ses effets de pouvoir et le pouvoir sur 
ses discours de vérité; ... la critique, cela sera l’art de l’inservitude volontaire, celui de 
l’indocilité réfléchie.”34 It would not be too much of a stretch to imagine that Foucault was 
thinking of La Boétie when he coined the expression “l’inservitude volontaire,” particularly 
since he was in large part reflecting on critique in the sixteenth century in the talk. The 
“inservitude volontaire” in question is not the project called for by La Boétie in his treatise—
insofar as advocating for a withdrawal of consent can be considered a project. It had more to do 
with a kind of intellectual insubordination. Perhaps one question for those of us interested in 
mobilizing the Servitude volontaire in the hope that it will encourage critical disobedience on the 
part of its readers would be how best to activate—and augment—its intellectual lessons which 
arguably are far more radical than its oft-fetishized political program. 
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